Looking at Baseball Prospectus from 2002, one finds this projection (a 'Wilton' in the parlance of the day) for Jose Ortiz: .330/.385/.534.
Ortiz was traded from Oakland to Colorado in 2001, after putting up a horrendous .167/.217/.167 in 46 plate appearances.
In Sacramento, before going to the Rockies, he put up .273/.345/.449
Once in Colorado, his line read .255/.314/.495 in 224 plate appearances.
So where did the .330/.385/.534 come from? Well, for that you have to go back to 2000, in Scramento .351/.408/.575. At age 23. In over 500 PAs.
The thing is, this looked way out of line with his production in Vancouver in 1999: .284/.346/.483
Eyeballing the lines, you'd have asked him to do that 2000 season over again before you gave him full credit. Yet the fact is, if you just weight the lines appropriately, and throw in a boost from Coors, you probably would get a .919 OPS.
I wouldn't like to say we've advanced so far in projection that such an error couldn't occur again. I suspect it has something to do with just automating a lot of calculations, and not checking what might appear anomalous. I don't doubt, regardless of whether the formulae are better, that a lot of these outcomes just get spat out of the computer still. But maybe they check them more.
Oh, Ortiz' real 2002 line? .250/.315/.313. In Coors. In 215 PA.
Sunday, 12 July 2009
Monday, 6 July 2009
Nationals Fielding Weekly #4
There's no real pattern I can see to the figures this week. Using Ultimate Zone Rating, a method for converting fielding chances into a +/- runs figure, which is complex and is adjusted according to how other players perform as well as to the peculiarities of the park, the non-Zimmerman infield improved sharply. The same sort of applies to Revised Zone Rating, which gives an average like batting average. However, UZR suggests the outfield play deteriorated. As far as I can tell, which isn't very far, these adjustments relate to some of Harris's play, some of Dunn's play and, on the infield, some of Zimmerman's play.*
'Median' refers to the zone ratings at the midpoint of the National League RZR chart at that position. I've put those players who are fielding above this level in bold.
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* As I've said before, I don't think UZR is really designed to be used in this way. It's more of an end-of-season thing. The best it can do in-season is give a guide as to who is the most valuable fielder on a team, and how he is doing relative to other fielders at his postion.
'Median' refers to the zone ratings at the midpoint of the National League RZR chart at that position. I've put those players who are fielding above this level in bold.
Player UZR Change UZR/150 Change RZR Change Median
Zimmerman (3b) 7.6 - 1.2 17.8 - 3.9 .757 -.018 .709-.701
Johnson (1b) -6.4 + 0.5 -10.4 + 1.5 .729 +.011 .781-.776
Guzman (ss) -3.8 - 0.9 - 7.4 + 6.3 .754 +.011 .807-.793
Hernandez (2b) 1.5 + 0.6 3.2 + 1.2 .846 -.010 .820-.806
Dunn (lf) -9.5 - 3.8 -23.4 - 9.7 .812 +.006 .873
Kearns (rf) -0.5 - 0.3 - 5.6 - 0.4 .877 +.002 .912
Willingham (lf) -2.2 n.c. - 6.5 - 0.1 .902 +.002 .873
Dukes (cf) -6.0 n.c. -23.3 + 0.4 .898 +.001 .944-.942
Harris (cf) -4.9 + 0.9 -15.4 + 8.4 .935 +.010 .944-.942
Dunn (rf) -6.7 - 0.2 -35.1 - 1.4 .756 n.c. .912
Belliard (2b) 1.4 - 0.2 9.0 - 0.8 .881 -.012 .820-.806
Gonzalez (ss) -2.0 n.c. -15.1 + 0.4 .718 n.c. .807-.793
Dukes (rf) 0.9 + 1.1 - 3.5 + 9.1 .952 +.005 .912
Willingham (rf) 0.4 n/a 5.7 n/a 1.000 n/a .912
Dunn (1b) -2.0 - 0.1 -37.4 - 0.6 .714 n.c. .781-.776
Maxwell (cf) 1.9 + 0.1 36.9 + 1.7 .833 n.c. .944-.942
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* As I've said before, I don't think UZR is really designed to be used in this way. It's more of an end-of-season thing. The best it can do in-season is give a guide as to who is the most valuable fielder on a team, and how he is doing relative to other fielders at his postion.
Sunday, 5 July 2009
Adventures in Independence Day Leverage
Yesterday's game is what baseball is all about, for me. The score wasn't too high, the game was dominated by pitching, and neither of the two contending teams gave up on the game.
During the game, I performed an exercise of calculating Leverage x Win Value in order to create a number that would represent the value of each event to winning the game. Instead of using the run value of each event, I used the win value as detailed in Tango, Litchtman, Dolphin's The Book. (Run values are used in the famous linear weights formula devised by Thorn and Palmer in The Hidden Game of Baseball.)
It was an interesting exercise, because it highlighted how a well-timed single can be far more valuable than a home run, and why on-base percentage is more valuable than slugging.
Dunn's home run in the bottom of the 7th, leading off, was worth 14.76 per cent of a win. But Zimmerman's single in the bottom of the 8th was worth 24.78 per cent of a win. Even Dunn's single in the next plate appearance was worth more than Dunn's homer, at 15.96 per cent of a win. By the time we get to Willingham's single, the cumulative effects of the runs scored up to that point have substantially reduced the leverage, and he only gets 4.62 per cent of a win.
The reason is the multiplier effect of leverage. The base runners and the differential in score added up to making those 8th-inning situations of greater significance. A typical linear-weights formula wouldn't have captured this, and just awarded Dunn a 1.44 runs for his home run and 0.44 runs for each of the three singles. Furthermore, it also accounts better for the effect of piling up baserunners, each additional runner pushes those already on base closer to home plate. Bard would not have scored from first on any of the Zimmerman-Dunn-Willingham hits; he had to get to second.
On another matter, anyone following this game would think bunting was a brilliant strategy. A bunt made the Braves' first run possible, and a bunt arguably resulted in the Nationals' being in a position to tie the game quickly, although in the subsequent walk meant the bunt really had no effect. I'm not trying to argue the point, just observing that in this game bunting worked.
Finally, I'm awarding a Hero of the Day to MacDougal, for defending the lead in the top of the 9th.
During the game, I performed an exercise of calculating Leverage x Win Value in order to create a number that would represent the value of each event to winning the game. Instead of using the run value of each event, I used the win value as detailed in Tango, Litchtman, Dolphin's The Book. (Run values are used in the famous linear weights formula devised by Thorn and Palmer in The Hidden Game of Baseball.)
It was an interesting exercise, because it highlighted how a well-timed single can be far more valuable than a home run, and why on-base percentage is more valuable than slugging.
Dunn's home run in the bottom of the 7th, leading off, was worth 14.76 per cent of a win. But Zimmerman's single in the bottom of the 8th was worth 24.78 per cent of a win. Even Dunn's single in the next plate appearance was worth more than Dunn's homer, at 15.96 per cent of a win. By the time we get to Willingham's single, the cumulative effects of the runs scored up to that point have substantially reduced the leverage, and he only gets 4.62 per cent of a win.
The reason is the multiplier effect of leverage. The base runners and the differential in score added up to making those 8th-inning situations of greater significance. A typical linear-weights formula wouldn't have captured this, and just awarded Dunn a 1.44 runs for his home run and 0.44 runs for each of the three singles. Furthermore, it also accounts better for the effect of piling up baserunners, each additional runner pushes those already on base closer to home plate. Bard would not have scored from first on any of the Zimmerman-Dunn-Willingham hits; he had to get to second.
On another matter, anyone following this game would think bunting was a brilliant strategy. A bunt made the Braves' first run possible, and a bunt arguably resulted in the Nationals' being in a position to tie the game quickly, although in the subsequent walk meant the bunt really had no effect. I'm not trying to argue the point, just observing that in this game bunting worked.
Finally, I'm awarding a Hero of the Day to MacDougal, for defending the lead in the top of the 9th.
Primer Cross Post: No to Trades for Trading's Sake
This article in the Washington Post generated this thread on Baseball Think Factory. I've posted an adapted version of my comment here.
I don't see the point of trading a veteran simply because he's got trade value. What you get back is equally important. Either it helps you or you don't do the deal.
Everyone wants the Nationals to trade Nick Johnson and to move Adam Dunn to first base. Dunn has shown no greater ability to play that position than left-field. If anything, he's looked worse. Johnson's injury history is going to count against him in deals, reducing his value to quarters on the dollar. And it's not as if the Nationals have a sure-fire can't miss long-term replacement in the organization.
Nobody talks about Cristian Guzmán much for reasons that are not quite clear to me, but appear to be related to fielding. Are these the same people who want to move Dunn to first? The Nationals actually do have a replacement in the organization for him, although it's a definite downgrade - Alberto Gonzalez, the former Attorney General. He definitely doesn't hit as well as Guzmán, and his fielding seems to be about the same.
The Nationals do have a surfeit of corner oufielders, including the aforementioned Dunn, but only Josh Willingham is at all marketable, unless someone wants Dunn. Nobody accepts Elijah Dukes' good behaviour represents a genuine conversion. (We'll know when they do when we start seeing articles about it in the paper.) Austin Kearns is playing too badly for his contract.
The Nationals have no depth anywhere else, except young pitching. If I were them, I'd see what I could get for Stammen or maybe Balester. But that would probably be an older guy like Nyjer Morgan again.
I don't see the point of trading a veteran simply because he's got trade value. What you get back is equally important. Either it helps you or you don't do the deal.
Everyone wants the Nationals to trade Nick Johnson and to move Adam Dunn to first base. Dunn has shown no greater ability to play that position than left-field. If anything, he's looked worse. Johnson's injury history is going to count against him in deals, reducing his value to quarters on the dollar. And it's not as if the Nationals have a sure-fire can't miss long-term replacement in the organization.
Nobody talks about Cristian Guzmán much for reasons that are not quite clear to me, but appear to be related to fielding. Are these the same people who want to move Dunn to first? The Nationals actually do have a replacement in the organization for him, although it's a definite downgrade - Alberto Gonzalez, the former Attorney General. He definitely doesn't hit as well as Guzmán, and his fielding seems to be about the same.
The Nationals do have a surfeit of corner oufielders, including the aforementioned Dunn, but only Josh Willingham is at all marketable, unless someone wants Dunn. Nobody accepts Elijah Dukes' good behaviour represents a genuine conversion. (We'll know when they do when we start seeing articles about it in the paper.) Austin Kearns is playing too badly for his contract.
The Nationals have no depth anywhere else, except young pitching. If I were them, I'd see what I could get for Stammen or maybe Balester. But that would probably be an older guy like Nyjer Morgan again.
Saturday, 4 July 2009
Manny Being Manny, Jesus Being Jesus, Adam Being...
Yesterday's game was a return to the bad old days of the middle of May. You remember that awful stretch, surely, when the offense was firing on all cylinders, but could not rely on any part of the pitching game (nor fielding for that matter). Actually, I wouldn't blame you if you'd chose to forget.
OK, so let's dissect this a bit.
1. Ross Detwiler stunk. This was without doubt his worst outing since he was brought up. He gave up too many hits, and the only other game where his control was as poor was the 14th June one. Shairon Martis was doing better than him just before he got sent down. Having said all that, my inclination is to give him one more outing. He's got a pattern of following two poor starts with a good one.
2. Let's see, top of the seventh, Jesus Colome trying to defend a tie with runners on first and second. Villone's warmed up in the bullpen, switch hitter at the plate. I remember thinking, 'don't do it Manny, bring in Villone'. Oh well, we know how that ended. Not that Villone would have been much of an improvement, lately...
3. ...as we saw in the very next inning. Villone loaded up the bases. The only out he got was given to him by a sacrifice bunt. I'm not sure how much I blame Villone/Tavárez for the run that came in, though. Villone was ordered to walk Escobar. Tavárez then walked in a run, what proved to be, in the end, the winning run. I think Mr Acta sometimes doesn't help his pitchers, because he gives them no room for mistakes—like not knowing the umpire's strike zone yet. Really, though, although I'm a fan of Tavárez, running through a sequence of Colome/Villone/Tavárez is just asking for trouble.
4. So, then, the Nationals' rally. And Adam Dunn is up. And he pops out! But that's Adam, what the English call a 'success or bust' player. I don't blame him for that. Adam's a very good player to me, with an outside chance at the Hall of Fame. He's got a better eye than most umpires. I've been doing some fiddling with the idea of Leverage, that each given plate appearance has a multiplier that indicates how significant it is. This one was very high, and Adam gave away about ten per cent of the game with it.
For me, the turning point of the game came on that intentional walk to Escobar. Mr Acta has a right to leave Colome in there, and not expect him to give up a home run. He has a right to expect Dunn (or Bard, who made the final out, and also gave away about ten per cent of the game) to come through in the clutch. He doesn't have a right to load the bases for a new pitcher. That's asking a heck of a lot.
Mr Acta has got a reputation as a sabermetric manager, but I think he sometimes overmanages. This is one instance where it bit him. (Unless, of course, it was Riggleman's suggestion.)
OK, so let's dissect this a bit.
1. Ross Detwiler stunk. This was without doubt his worst outing since he was brought up. He gave up too many hits, and the only other game where his control was as poor was the 14th June one. Shairon Martis was doing better than him just before he got sent down. Having said all that, my inclination is to give him one more outing. He's got a pattern of following two poor starts with a good one.
2. Let's see, top of the seventh, Jesus Colome trying to defend a tie with runners on first and second. Villone's warmed up in the bullpen, switch hitter at the plate. I remember thinking, 'don't do it Manny, bring in Villone'. Oh well, we know how that ended. Not that Villone would have been much of an improvement, lately...
3. ...as we saw in the very next inning. Villone loaded up the bases. The only out he got was given to him by a sacrifice bunt. I'm not sure how much I blame Villone/Tavárez for the run that came in, though. Villone was ordered to walk Escobar. Tavárez then walked in a run, what proved to be, in the end, the winning run. I think Mr Acta sometimes doesn't help his pitchers, because he gives them no room for mistakes—like not knowing the umpire's strike zone yet. Really, though, although I'm a fan of Tavárez, running through a sequence of Colome/Villone/Tavárez is just asking for trouble.
4. So, then, the Nationals' rally. And Adam Dunn is up. And he pops out! But that's Adam, what the English call a 'success or bust' player. I don't blame him for that. Adam's a very good player to me, with an outside chance at the Hall of Fame. He's got a better eye than most umpires. I've been doing some fiddling with the idea of Leverage, that each given plate appearance has a multiplier that indicates how significant it is. This one was very high, and Adam gave away about ten per cent of the game with it.
For me, the turning point of the game came on that intentional walk to Escobar. Mr Acta has a right to leave Colome in there, and not expect him to give up a home run. He has a right to expect Dunn (or Bard, who made the final out, and also gave away about ten per cent of the game) to come through in the clutch. He doesn't have a right to load the bases for a new pitcher. That's asking a heck of a lot.
Mr Acta has got a reputation as a sabermetric manager, but I think he sometimes overmanages. This is one instance where it bit him. (Unless, of course, it was Riggleman's suggestion.)
Effect on
Pitcher Win Expectancy
Colome -.624
Villone -.140
Tavárez -.081
Clippard -.052
Beimel .010
Burnett .044
Friday, 3 July 2009
Bullpen Tragic Week
The curse of the Nationals' bullpen struck again this week, as they proved unable to defend leads or even to keep the team in the game.
27th June
28th June
29th June
30th June
1st July
I've only awarded Goat status in losses, but making good leads into precarious ones really does deserve some kind of notice, so I've posted the evidence here.
27th June
Pitcher Win Expectancy
Effect
Beimel -.213
MacDougal -.075
Tavárez .054
28th June
Pitcher Win Expectancy
Effect
MacDougal -.103
Beimel -.053
29th June
Pitcher Win Expectancy
Effect
Villone -.554
Tavárez -.177
30th June
Pitcher Win Expectancy
Effect
Beimel -1.155
Clippard - .163
1st July
Pitcher Win Expectancy
Effect
MacDougal -.661
Burnett -.308
Tavárez -.285
I've only awarded Goat status in losses, but making good leads into precarious ones really does deserve some kind of notice, so I've posted the evidence here.
Wednesday, 1 July 2009
The "Big Trade"
When the Nationals acquired Nyjer Morgan yesterday, the reaction from the sabermetric community was almost unanimously negative towards the move for Washington.
Thus Dave Cameron at Fangraphs writes on the trade between the Washington Nationals and the Pittsburgh Pirates. (The comments are pretty good, too.) I'm a late ballot, but count me as a sabermetric community member who thinks the trade was a good one for Washington.
The big negatives directed at the trade can be reduced to two elements: Lastings Milledge's potential and the idea that Joel Hanrahan can be a good reliever.
I've not seen Milledge play, having last season been following the Detroit Tigers. I've heard of his reputation among the sabermetric community for a couple of years now, but he's a former New York Mets' prospect, and my empirical observations lead me to find Mets' prospects are routinely overhyped. I have, however, seen Elijah Dukes play. I like Dukes. He's not particularly fast, having trouble with the initial acceleration. Consequently, he routinely has problems on the basepaths and in the field. However, he's got an accurate, strong arm. He's a solid, if unspectacular hitter. He'll do in rightfield.
What the Nationals need is a centrefielder who will make up for the defensively challenged Dunn in left and Dukes' mediocrity in right. The Nationals' outfield is a bigger problem than the infield, and easier to fix. As Dave Cameron's defensive analysis illustrated, Morgan is probably about average in centre. This is an improvement and an important one.
Hanrahan is indeed a pitcher with potential, but his experience this season in Washington has just destroyed him. The fans appear to despise him, and management has lost all confidence in him. He may indeed have lost confidence in himself. No lead is safe with Hanrahan on the mound.
The thing is, going forward the Nationals have placed all their bets on a young starting pitching rotation. Tearing up their confidence by having bad defence in the outfield and a bullpen that can't hold a lead is probably the biggest failing of the current roster. Getting rid of Hanrahan and improving the outfield defence are actions that fix the problem. Milledge was surplus to requirements, unless the sabermetric community thinks that it was better to keep Milledge than Dunn. Maybe that's what they do think. But none of them have really addressed this point, that the Nationals have a surplus of corner outfielders. Isn't that what a good GM is supposed to do? Deal from a surplus to fix a problem?
A hearty 'well done, Mr Rizzo' from this corner of the sabermetric community.
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