It really started here. But that was a blogpost about this. And it was soon followed by something we perhaps didn't know we needed.
While there are many fine new fielding metrics around using PBP (play-by-play data), to me the really important breakthrough is going to come when we get a reliable metric for fielding in the pre-PBP days. That's going to involve some kind of assumption about a piece of information we'll never have for most of baseball history - how many hits was a fielder responsible for.
I suspect it's quite important to start from the team level when calculating the value of fielding. (See Clay Davenport's article in the 2002 Baseball Prospectus for an example.) You then have a choice - either you can calculate the total of opportunities from the assumption that all balls will fall for hits, and thus the caught balls represent runs saved. Or you can look at fielding in terms of runs allowed, by thinking in terms of the number of mistakes. I suspect for a decent 'all of baseball history' metric, we need to think more along the lines of the latter. We need to establish 'expected runs' baseline against which to measure fielding.
I also came to a key realization after reading all this. Looking at the statistics when I was developing my Defensive Winning Percentage, I was surprised at how narrow the band is of fielding effectiveness. This is, I think, a reflection that there's both a floor and a ceiling to the effectiveness of fielders. Some of the credit is all down to the pitcher. All home runs except those inside-the-park, for example, are the pitcher's fault. Only some of the runs scored by those who walk, however, are the pitcher's fault. So there's some fielding input on that. But a walk and home run equals all the pitcher's fault.
Probably, the Fielding Experts will say I'm not being very original here. But I hadn't thought of it that way before.
Thursday, 11 June 2009
Tuesday, 9 June 2009
Draft Day & Unfinished Business
Today is the amateur baseball draft. In the olden days, one didn't know much about it until the next day's papers. Then, mlb.com started offering the audio of the conference call. I loved that. Great soundtrack for a June afternoon. Now it's one big party. Can't we go back to the olden days?
I also owe this blog some links to very interesting work related to defensive statistics that appeared on the Web recently. It's made me look back over my Defensive Winning Percentage method. I'll get round to it, I promise.
I also owe this blog some links to very interesting work related to defensive statistics that appeared on the Web recently. It's made me look back over my Defensive Winning Percentage method. I'll get round to it, I promise.
Monday, 8 June 2009
Nationals' Bullpen Goats of the Day #s 10, 11, 12, 13
I've been a bit remiss this week, not awarding Goats of the Day. In part this is because the bullpen has generally improved, and it seems unfair to fault them for problems elsewhere on the team. However, here's the roundup for the eight games prior to Sunday's.
29 May - No award, batting failure.
30 May vs Phillies
31 May vs Phillies
2 June - Nats Win!
4 June vs Giants (game 1)
4 June vs Giants (game 2) - rain stopped play in 6th. No bullpen usage.
5 June vs Mets
6 June - Nats Win!
So four more names in the book. Time I ran some standings, maybe.
29 May - No award, batting failure.
30 May vs Phillies
Reliever Effect on
Win Expectancy
Villone -0.349
MacDougal -0.062
Tavárez -0.009
Colome 0.008
Wells 0.012
Bergmann 0.024
31 May vs Phillies
Reliever Effect on
Win Expectancy
Beimel -0.191
Hanrahan 0.017
Bergmann 0.034
2 June - Nats Win!
4 June vs Giants (game 1)
Reliever Effect on
Win Expectancy
Hanrahan -0.187
Beimel -0.022
MacDougal 0.059
Villone 0.062
4 June vs Giants (game 2) - rain stopped play in 6th. No bullpen usage.
5 June vs Mets
Reliever Effect on
Win Expectancy
Hanrahan -0.794
Villone -0.114
Bergmann -0.078
Beimel 0.114
MacDougal 0.153
6 June - Nats Win!
So four more names in the book. Time I ran some standings, maybe.
Friday, 5 June 2009
Nats' xFIP Horror Show
For me, the best thing about the Hardball Times' web site is the statistics. (Well, next to some excellent articles from time-to-time, a subject I shall return to, I hope, over the weekend.)
Of course, if one is a fan of the Washington Nationals, this can create some upsetting reading. When I first stumbled over baseball on 'teh Intertube', as they say at Baseball Primer, DIPS had just hit version 2.0, I think, or was about to. The theory of DIPS is that pitchers have very little influence on the outcomes of balls in play. Out of the DIPS debate emerged FIP, or Fielding Independent Pitching, a way of calculating an ERA that set to one side the balls in play. And then the chaps at Hardball Times developed xFIP, which adjusts the home runs allowed in relation to the ratio of fly balls allowed by the pitcher. (Their research seems to indicate that a pretty consistent percentage of fly balls go for home runs, once one adjusts for the effects of the ballpark, and random variations.)
The objective of xFIP is to find a number that will more accurately predict a pitcher's future ERA. It works a bit better for starters than for relievers, although you can use it with caution for relievers. So, how about those Nationals?
Remember, these numbers don't include fielders booting balls, or just not having the range to get to a grounder. This is strikeouts, walks and home runs. It's pretty horrific, especially a closer with a 3.90 xFIP — relievers, to be useful, generally need to be at least half a run better than an average starter, and closers more like a run or more.
Basically, going by xFIP, Zimmermann looks good going forward, Detwiler is about a league average pitcher, and Lannan and maybe Stammen can fill out the back of a competitive team's rotation. And, as of 5 June 2009, that's all Nationals' fans have in the whole bullpen that's really worth keeping.
Of course, if one is a fan of the Washington Nationals, this can create some upsetting reading. When I first stumbled over baseball on 'teh Intertube', as they say at Baseball Primer, DIPS had just hit version 2.0, I think, or was about to. The theory of DIPS is that pitchers have very little influence on the outcomes of balls in play. Out of the DIPS debate emerged FIP, or Fielding Independent Pitching, a way of calculating an ERA that set to one side the balls in play. And then the chaps at Hardball Times developed xFIP, which adjusts the home runs allowed in relation to the ratio of fly balls allowed by the pitcher. (Their research seems to indicate that a pretty consistent percentage of fly balls go for home runs, once one adjusts for the effects of the ballpark, and random variations.)
The objective of xFIP is to find a number that will more accurately predict a pitcher's future ERA. It works a bit better for starters than for relievers, although you can use it with caution for relievers. So, how about those Nationals?
Pitcher xFIP
Zimmermann 3.36
Hanrahan 3.90
Detwiler 4.46
Colome 4.66
Tavárez 4.81
Lannan 4.92
Olsen 5.04
Wells 5.05
Stammen 5.06
Villone 5.20
Beimel 5.32
Martis 5.61
Bergmann 5.97
Remember, these numbers don't include fielders booting balls, or just not having the range to get to a grounder. This is strikeouts, walks and home runs. It's pretty horrific, especially a closer with a 3.90 xFIP — relievers, to be useful, generally need to be at least half a run better than an average starter, and closers more like a run or more.
Basically, going by xFIP, Zimmermann looks good going forward, Detwiler is about a league average pitcher, and Lannan and maybe Stammen can fill out the back of a competitive team's rotation. And, as of 5 June 2009, that's all Nationals' fans have in the whole bullpen that's really worth keeping.
Thursday, 4 June 2009
Day of the Lunkhead
Yesterday, one of the last links to the 2004 Expos, Randy St Claire, was fired. He was philosophical about it all, which is fair enough. He was unlikely to be part of a contending Nationals team, which is probably one more manager away from that destination. Pitching coaches are often cronies of the manager, and it seemed unlikely he'd survive the next change. He'd also had a good run, some seven years as a pitching coach, and built a good reputation. I imagine he'll get a new job soon enough.
In the evening, Broadcaster Dibble, who is chalk to my cheese, started the game preview with a comment that basically said St Claire wasn't really the problem, that the pitchers need to throw strikes. Fair enough. If he'd left it there, I would have had nothing to blog about. But that's the trouble with Broadcaster Dibble, he never leaves well enough alone. Later in the broadcast, he launched into an incoherent ramble that started with pitchers needing to throw strikes, wandered into enthusiasm over Steve McCatty's 'by the gut' approach in contrast with St Claire's cerebral emphasis on game plans and mechanics, highlighted the fact that it wasn't just this year that Nationals' pitching was below league par, and wound up on a note that St Claire couldn't carry the entire can because the talent pitching for the Nationals wasn't up to scratch.
You're left with three conclusions - Broadcaster Dibble doesn't want to hurt anyone's feelings; Broadcaster Dibble doesn't like an intellectual approach to the game; Broadcaster Dibble will just say whatever sounds good at the moment. And why not? Broadcasting is a very ephemeral occupation, very much here now, gone in a second. Unless, of course, you can watch the game again on the Greatest Invention Before Matt Wieters, mlb.tv
Then, while listening to the rain delay for tonight's game, I hear Pitching Coach McCatty. He's a sincere enough fellow, it sounds like. However, he was asked some question about video and said something along the lines of 'Yeah, I liked Lethal Weapon.' Now, I ask you — is he being glib or sarcastic? The persona he evinces suggests glib. However, would any modern pitching coach not consult video? Is this just a humourous way to say, Weaver-style, 'that's a @#$%!+\*&/(>< dumb question'? I don't really like bright people who pretend to be stupid, though. It often carries this kind of double-message, and might take advantage of the innocent waïf in a cruel and un-Christian manner.
Finally, the whole business raises some questions about this odd organization. At the AAA level, they had McCatty, who at the very least pretends to a radically different method to St Claire. Once you graduate McCatty Academy, you get to the Collège de St Claire, where suddenly you are asked to learn a whole new approach to pitching. These guys come up from the minors, nervous as a virgin on her wedding day, and they start getting seminars in place of heart-to-hearts? This does not suggest a seamless garment of organizational philosophy from Rookie League to The Show. I think that tells us more than General Manager Mike Rizzo might have intended about The Nationals' Way.
In the evening, Broadcaster Dibble, who is chalk to my cheese, started the game preview with a comment that basically said St Claire wasn't really the problem, that the pitchers need to throw strikes. Fair enough. If he'd left it there, I would have had nothing to blog about. But that's the trouble with Broadcaster Dibble, he never leaves well enough alone. Later in the broadcast, he launched into an incoherent ramble that started with pitchers needing to throw strikes, wandered into enthusiasm over Steve McCatty's 'by the gut' approach in contrast with St Claire's cerebral emphasis on game plans and mechanics, highlighted the fact that it wasn't just this year that Nationals' pitching was below league par, and wound up on a note that St Claire couldn't carry the entire can because the talent pitching for the Nationals wasn't up to scratch.
You're left with three conclusions - Broadcaster Dibble doesn't want to hurt anyone's feelings; Broadcaster Dibble doesn't like an intellectual approach to the game; Broadcaster Dibble will just say whatever sounds good at the moment. And why not? Broadcasting is a very ephemeral occupation, very much here now, gone in a second. Unless, of course, you can watch the game again on the Greatest Invention Before Matt Wieters, mlb.tv
Then, while listening to the rain delay for tonight's game, I hear Pitching Coach McCatty. He's a sincere enough fellow, it sounds like. However, he was asked some question about video and said something along the lines of 'Yeah, I liked Lethal Weapon.' Now, I ask you — is he being glib or sarcastic? The persona he evinces suggests glib. However, would any modern pitching coach not consult video? Is this just a humourous way to say, Weaver-style, 'that's a @#$%!+\*&/(>< dumb question'? I don't really like bright people who pretend to be stupid, though. It often carries this kind of double-message, and might take advantage of the innocent waïf in a cruel and un-Christian manner.
Finally, the whole business raises some questions about this odd organization. At the AAA level, they had McCatty, who at the very least pretends to a radically different method to St Claire. Once you graduate McCatty Academy, you get to the Collège de St Claire, where suddenly you are asked to learn a whole new approach to pitching. These guys come up from the minors, nervous as a virgin on her wedding day, and they start getting seminars in place of heart-to-hearts? This does not suggest a seamless garment of organizational philosophy from Rookie League to The Show. I think that tells us more than General Manager Mike Rizzo might have intended about The Nationals' Way.
Tuesday, 2 June 2009
More Field of Goats
I didn't realize, but UZR (a/k/a Ultimate Zone Rating), another method of rating fielding, is now available through Fangraphs. It's a daunting set of numbers, but the key one to look at is the last column, which measures the number of runs that a given fielder will 'save' over 150 games.
So let's run that ranking I did yesterday again. This ranked each player's fielding rating against those of qualified players in the NL. In most cases, that's about twelve players per position.
1b: Johnson, last
2b: Belliard, 4th; Hernandez, 9th.
3b: Zimmerman, 1st.
ss: Guzman, 11th.
lf: Willingham, 7th; Dunn, last.
cf: Dukes, last; Harris, last.
rf: Kearns, 7th; Dunn, last.
They more or less agree. Zimmerman comes out a lot higher in UZR, Willingham a bit lower. UZR does suggest that Dukes would make a good rightfielder, and Maxwell a GREAT centrefielder. If Mr Acta was channelling the Ghost of Bill McKechnie, he'd put Maxwell in centre, regardless of how he hit. In the circumstances, I think I would, too.
So let's run that ranking I did yesterday again. This ranked each player's fielding rating against those of qualified players in the NL. In most cases, that's about twelve players per position.
1b: Johnson, last
2b: Belliard, 4th; Hernandez, 9th.
3b: Zimmerman, 1st.
ss: Guzman, 11th.
lf: Willingham, 7th; Dunn, last.
cf: Dukes, last; Harris, last.
rf: Kearns, 7th; Dunn, last.
They more or less agree. Zimmerman comes out a lot higher in UZR, Willingham a bit lower. UZR does suggest that Dukes would make a good rightfielder, and Maxwell a GREAT centrefielder. If Mr Acta was channelling the Ghost of Bill McKechnie, he'd put Maxwell in centre, regardless of how he hit. In the circumstances, I think I would, too.
Monday, 1 June 2009
Field of Goats
I haven't decided whether to do a Goat of the Day for the loss today against the Phillies. I have, however, finally done something I've been meaning to do for a while.
Nationals fans don't need to be told that their fielding is poor. The real question is 'how poor?'. Your typical baseball fan looks at the players objectively, in a kind of philosophical way. Babe Ruth or Ted Williams is the 'ideal' major-league ballplayer. Someone like Willie Horton has certain ballplayer qualities, but is not so perfect. Then you have the Sandy Valdespinos of this world, who have been seen with major-league ballplayers, but few would mistake them for one.
However, in practical terms, a baseball 'manager' needs to look at a team relatively, not objectively. Relative to what? Why, to their peers, of course. If your team's players are universally in the lower regions of a skill set, you've got a problem that needs fixing. Compare all your problems, and the worst ones are the ones that most need attention.
Instead of trotting out some numbers, and pretending to be all scientific, I'm going to be wholly empirical. Let me take the RZR numbers from The Hardball Times' fielding statistics, and rank all Nationals' fielders who have played 96 innings against the National League qualifiers at each position. (Catchers don't get an RZR, so we'll ignore them.) Please note that at no position do we have sixteen qualifiers, but usually about twelve or so.
1b: Johnson, 9th.
2b: Hernandez, 8th; Belliard, 1st.
3b: Zimmerman, 5th.
ss: Guzman, last; Gonzalez, 12th (or one ahead of Guzman).
lf: Willingham, 4th; Dunn, last.
cf: Dukes, last; Harris, last.
rf: Kearns, 12th; Dunn, last.
So, any suggestions?
I have two. Use Belliard as a late-inning defensive replacement for Hernandez. He's doing quite well with the leather. Make Willingham the regular left-fielder. On the evidence so far he's a tolerable glove out there. Most everything else is a sinkhole, defensively, except for Zimmerman, and even he's not going to make anyone forget Brooks Robinson in a hurry. A centerfielder is probably the most urgent need, since none of the options tried so far (except possibly for Kearns, whose sample size is as yet too small) finish anything but last.
Nationals fans don't need to be told that their fielding is poor. The real question is 'how poor?'. Your typical baseball fan looks at the players objectively, in a kind of philosophical way. Babe Ruth or Ted Williams is the 'ideal' major-league ballplayer. Someone like Willie Horton has certain ballplayer qualities, but is not so perfect. Then you have the Sandy Valdespinos of this world, who have been seen with major-league ballplayers, but few would mistake them for one.
However, in practical terms, a baseball 'manager' needs to look at a team relatively, not objectively. Relative to what? Why, to their peers, of course. If your team's players are universally in the lower regions of a skill set, you've got a problem that needs fixing. Compare all your problems, and the worst ones are the ones that most need attention.
Instead of trotting out some numbers, and pretending to be all scientific, I'm going to be wholly empirical. Let me take the RZR numbers from The Hardball Times' fielding statistics, and rank all Nationals' fielders who have played 96 innings against the National League qualifiers at each position. (Catchers don't get an RZR, so we'll ignore them.) Please note that at no position do we have sixteen qualifiers, but usually about twelve or so.
1b: Johnson, 9th.
2b: Hernandez, 8th; Belliard, 1st.
3b: Zimmerman, 5th.
ss: Guzman, last; Gonzalez, 12th (or one ahead of Guzman).
lf: Willingham, 4th; Dunn, last.
cf: Dukes, last; Harris, last.
rf: Kearns, 12th; Dunn, last.
So, any suggestions?
I have two. Use Belliard as a late-inning defensive replacement for Hernandez. He's doing quite well with the leather. Make Willingham the regular left-fielder. On the evidence so far he's a tolerable glove out there. Most everything else is a sinkhole, defensively, except for Zimmerman, and even he's not going to make anyone forget Brooks Robinson in a hurry. A centerfielder is probably the most urgent need, since none of the options tried so far (except possibly for Kearns, whose sample size is as yet too small) finish anything but last.
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